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Introduction
Never before in history have we known so much about
the earth and our interactions with it. Science has been
a great investment, and now scientists the world over
are sending a solemn warning: we are changing the
climate, and the threat this poses to the economy and
society is significant. These threats are not merely a
marginal concern. They relate to the natural resource
backbone of economic and political life.
This paper offers an introduction to basic climate change
science for policy makers. Presenting this backdrop helps
to set a context for policy development by exploring
the bigger-picture issues that policy makers will need to
address in coming decades. In the process, it signals how
climate change has an impact on a wide range of policy
frameworks, necessitating an integrated policy response.
This scientific story is built on what is now a broad
consensus in the climate science community. This
consensus is based on an understanding that:
• climate change in general is a natural feature of the
global climate system and always has been;
• climate change is a function of the dynamic
interrelationship between many components of the
climate system (including greenhouse gas
concentrations); and that
• if humans change any combination of those
components, we have the ability to influence the
climate system.
The consensus can be boiled down to the following:
• Climate change is currently happening.
• Humans are a significant causal factor.
• Climate change poses a substantial threat to the
economy and society.
• We will need to invest in strategies to cope with
climate change (adaptation).
• We can lower the scale of impacts by reducing
greenhouse gas emissions (mitigation).
Policy makers need to have confidence in the
information guiding their decisions. The source of
confidence for this consensus is to be found in the peer-
reviewed climate science literature. This literature is so
vast that in 1988 the United Nations established a
scientific review and advisory body on this topic: the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Every six years the IPCC publishes an interdisciplinary
scientific review and assessment that summarises the
latest climate change research in three broad categories:
1. scientific basis;
2. impacts, adaptation and vulnerability; and
3. mitigation.
The latest is the Third Assessment Report (2001) – a 3,061-
page synthesis by over 1,000 authors and expert reviewers
of over 11,000 peer-reviewed scientific studies. Over 10,000
scientific studies have been published in the peer-reviewed
literature since then, which adds to the material for the
Fourth Assessment Report due out in 2007. The result of
this review process is a captivating story that is exceedingly
relevant to policy makers the world over.
Sea level rise
Sea levels are rising globally. They rose by between 10
cm and 20 cm over the last 100 years, are currently
rising at 1.8 mm/yr (ten times faster than the rate
observed for the last 3,000 years), and are forecast to
rise by between 20 cm and 80 cm by the end of the
century (IPCC, 2001a). This is due to thermal
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expansion of the oceans as they warm (a consequence
of global atmospheric warming), and also because large
volumes of ice that have been on the land for many
thousands of years are melting and transferring some of
this volume to the sea.
During ice ages sea levels drop because a large proportion
of global precipitation falls as snow and stays on the land
rather than running into the sea. This snow accumulates
over many thousands of years, forming glaciers and ice
sheets. Global sea levels during the last glacial maximum
(around 20,000 years ago) were about 125 metres below
current sea levels. As the climate warms during
interglacials (such as the one we are experiencing now),
this ice melts (flowing into the sea as water) and the
proportion of precipitation that falls as snow declines.
This raises sea levels. If the warming levels off, sea level
rise will slow or cease, as has been the case for the last few
thousand years. But with current global warming we can
expect additional sea level rise as indicated above.
The source of water contributing to current sea level rise
includes the huge ice sheets of Greenland and Antarctica.
If the Greenland Ice Sheet melted completely it would
add about 6 vertical metres to global sea levels. In
Antarctica there are two ice sheets – the West Antarctic
Ice Sheet (representing about 6 metres of global sea level),
and the huge East Antarctic Ice Sheet (about 60 metres
of global sea level). It would take thousands of years for
these ice sheets to melt completely, even if global mean
temperatures became warm enough to render them
unsustainable – in the same way that it takes a while for
a block of ice to melt once we have taken it out of the
freezer. But as the melting progresses, more and more
water runs off, adding to the volume of the oceans. There
is also a risk that large chunks of ice sheets can break up
and slide quickly into the oceans, which is a regular feature
of ice sheets when they become unstable in a warming
climate. This could raise sea levels suddenly long before
the ice melts, in the same way that the level of a liquid in
a glass rises when we put ice in a drink.
The British Antarctic Survey now indicates that this is
a possibility for the West Antarctic Ice Sheet (Tirpak et
al., 2005). Currently, 75% of the glaciers on the
Antarctic peninsula (adjacent to the West Antarctic Ice
Sheet) are in retreat (Rapley, 2005), and in 2002 the
huge Larsen B Ice Shelf2  (3,250 km2 in area and 220 m
thick) disintegrated. This is consequentially leading to
a two- to six-fold increase in the speed of glaciers at
their terminus, which are now moving more quickly
into the sea in the absence of this ice shelf barrier
(NSIDC, 2002). In 1995 the 1,600 km2 Larsen A ice
shelf collapsed, followed in 1998 by the collapse of the
1,100 km2 Wilkins Ice Shelf. In the last 50 years some
13,000 km2 of ice shelf have collapsed in this region
(Rapley, 2005). Current data also show that the
Greenland Ice Sheet is melting faster than expected: the
area of surface melt by the end of the 2002 season had
broken all known records (NASA Earth Observatory,
2003). It is currently estimated that a global mean
temperature increase of 2.70C would surpass a threshold
triggering the melting of the Greenland Ice Sheet
(Tirpak et al., 2005). Sea ice in the Arctic is also in
rapid decline. In September 2004, at the end of the
summer melt, the extent of the sea ice was 13.4% less
than average. Similar declines were observed in
September 2003 (12% less than average) and in
September 2002 (15% less than average) (NASA Earth
Observatory, 2004). Some models predict a complete
disappearance of Arctic summer sea ice by 2070
(NSIDC, 2004). In addition, the majority of the world’s
glaciers are in retreat, according to the World Glacier
Monitoring Service.
Global warming
Global mean surface temperature has risen by 0.70C
since 1900, and is projected by the IPCC to rise by
between 1.40C and 5.80C above 1990 levels by 2100
(IPCC, 2001a). It is important to remember that we
are talking about mean temperature for the global
climate system (i.e. the mean of all temperature gauges
all over the world) and not merely regional or seasonal
variation in the weather. Furthermore, warming is
unevenly distributed around the world – an average
warming of 20C globally may translate into 100C of
warming at the poles. To get an idea of the scale we are
looking at: the last time the earth’s mean surface
temperature was 3–40C warmer than today was around
34 million years ago, when Antarctica was 150C warmer
and was covered in forest (Barrett, 2001).
Current warming is attributed to a combination of
2 An ‘ice shelf’ is connected to land but floats on the sea (e.g. the
Ross Ice Shelf over the Ross Sea in Antarctica). An ‘ice sheet’ is
located entirely on the land; the only ones currently in existence are
the Greenland Ice Sheet, the East Antarctic Ice Sheet and the West
Antarctic Ice Sheet. The Greenland Ice Sheet is about 3 km deep at
its summit.
V
ol
um
e 
2,
 N
um
be
r 
1 
20
06
12
natural and human-induced influences, the latter arising
predominantly from an increase in atmospheric CO
2
concentrations.
Greenhouse gas concentrations
The atmosphere is made up of two major gases
(nitrogen, 78%, and oxygen, 21%), with the remaining
1% made up of a large number of trace gases. A small
number of these trace gases are known as ‘greenhouse
gases’ due to their ability to re-emit infrared radiation
reflecting from the earth’s surface, acting as a form of
insulation. This is due to the way their molecular
structure interacts with infrared radiation. The natural
greenhouse gases include carbon dioxide (CO
2
),
methane (CH
4
), nitrogen oxide (NO
2
) and water vapour
(H
2
O). These greenhouse gases contribute to the natural
greenhouse effect that keeps the earth’s climate
considerably warmer than it would be otherwise. If the
earth had no greenhouse gases the global mean surface
temperature would be about –190C. With natural
greenhouse gases we get a global mean surface
temperature of about 140C (a 330C difference), which
is much more suitable for life. If greenhouse gas
concentrations increase, the mean surface temperature
increases accordingly (IPCC, 2001a; Kump et al., 2004).
Atmospheric CO
2
 concentrations have increased from
280 ppm (parts per million) in 1750 (IPCC, 2001a) to
374.9 ppm in 2003 (Blasing and Jones, 2005). This is
an increase of over 30%. These levels are rising because
of two global processes associated with economic
development since the industrial revolution:
1. the transformation of large volumes of fossil carbon
(e.g. coal, oil, natural gas) into atmospheric CO
2
from burning these fuels; and
2. the transformation of large volumes of living carbon
(e.g. wood, soil carbon) into atmospheric CO
2
 as a
consequence of widespread deforestation.
About half of these CO
2
 emissions are reabsorbed by the
biosphere (predominantly the oceans), leaving about half
of all that is emitted behind in the atmosphere (IPCC,
2001a). As the volume of CO
2
 emissions has increased,
atmospheric CO
2
 concentrations have increased. One of
the best examples of this global trend is the ‘Keeling
Curve’, which shows a steady increase in atmospheric CO
2
concentrations from 1958 to the present (see Figure 1).
As indicated above, global warming is one of the
consequences of rising CO
2
 levels. Another consequence
is an increase in the acidity of the oceans. More
atmospheric CO
2 
means more absorption of CO
2 
by the
Figure 1: The rise of atmospheric CO2 concentrations as measured by Charles Keeling and collaborators at
Mauna Loa, Hawaii. The unit ‘ppm’ stands for ‘parts per million by volume’. The zig-zag in the curve refers to
seasonal variation. Source: Keeling and Whorf (2000).
Figure 1. The ‘Keeling Curve’ of atmospheric CO
2
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ocean, which leads to an increase in the amount of
carbonic acid in the water. At the current rate of CO
2
emissions, ocean surface water pH will be 0.4 units more
acidic by 2100 – a level unprecedented for 20 million
years (Turley et al., 2005). This has two adverse effects
of concern to human society:
1. The rate at which the oceans are able to absorb CO
2
declines.
2. The biochemistry of surface waters changes, causing:
a. coral bleaching (in combination with higher sea
surface temperatures); and
b. disruption to marine food chains (particularly as
plankton, shellfish and the eggs and sperm of fish
have a low tolerance to changes in acidity). This
can pose a significant threat to fish stocks and
the fishing industry.
Understanding the present by looking
into the past
To understand the significance of this increase in CO
2
concentrations, it is helpful to look at the record we
have built up of past climate through analysing several
different records of past climate:
• the instrumental record (since the late 17th century);
• historical records of past living conditions (a few
thousand years);
• tree ring data from living and archaeological wood
specimens (a few thousand years);
• sediments on land and in lakes (thousands and tens
of thousands of years);
• ice cores (hundreds of thousands of years); and
• deep ocean sediments (millions of years).
Of particular importance is ice core research from large
ice sheets in Antarctica and Greenland, which provide a
record of both past temperature and past atmospheric
composition. Ice is laid down in annual layers, a little
like tree rings. Air bubbles trapped in ice layers (as snow
is compacted) provide a sample of past atmospheric
composition and enable us to reconstruct a record of past
changes in concentrations of different gases. Stable
isotopes3  of oxygen in the ice can be measured in these
Figure 2: Vostok Ice Core record of variations in air temperature (relative to the current average temperature of
–55.5°C at Vostok) and CO
2
 concentrations from gas bubbles in the ice. Solid line = CO
2
 concentrations; dotted
line = temperature. Temperature measured in 0C. High points on the graph represent interglacial periods (like the
one we are in currently), and lower points represent glaciations (the last glacial maximum being around 20,000
years ago). Data from Petit et al. (1999).
Figure 2. Vostok Ice Core record of past climate
3 An isotope is one of several forms of an element (e.g. oxygen) with
the same number of protons as the normal form but a different
number of neutrons, giving it a different atomic weight. Unstable
isotopes are radioactive, whereas stable isotopes are not.
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layers to give a proxy record of past temperature. The
proportion of different isotopes in the ice is influenced
by the temperature when this ice fell as snow. We can test
the accuracy of this paleo-thermometer by measuring the
oxygen isotopes in water, snow and ice in different parts
of the world today (i.e. where there are different climates),
and this has shown that the proxy record from isotopes
matches the instrumental record very well (Alley, 2000).
When ice core data was used to reconstruct both past
climates and past atmospheric gas compositions, an
interesting correlation was discovered: when atmospheric
CO
2
 concentrations were high, mean temperatures were
also high. When atmospheric CO
2
 concentrations were
low, mean temperatures were low. A remarkable record
of this parallel process can be seen in ice core records in
both Greenland and Antarctica. The most famous is the
Vostok Ice Core from Antarctica (Figure 2).
This close association between atmospheric CO
2
concentrations and mean surface temperature helps
to show the likely effect of an increase in CO
2
concentrations as a consequence of industrial
emissions. Broadly speaking, an increase in CO
2
Figure 3: Current and future projections of atmospheric CO2 concentrations based on the Vostok Ice Core
baseline. Current CO
2
 concentrations are well above interglacial peak concentrations for the last three
interglacials. Future projections based on IPCC (2001a) projections under different mitigation scenarios.
Figure 3. Current and future projections of atmospheric CO
2
 concentration
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concentration is likely to lead to an increase in mean
surface temperature because of the way CO
2
 functions
as a greenhouse gas, together with feedbacks in the
climate system responding to increased temperature.
One of the key feedbacks associated with warming
derived from increases in atmospheric CO
2
 is additional
evaporation leading to an increase in atmospheric water
vapour (a much more potent greenhouse gas than
CO
2
). Consequently, the total warming triggered by
additional CO
2
 is greater than the warming that can
be attributed to increases in CO
2
 alone. There are many
other feedbacks in the climate system, some positive
(reinforcing the warming trend, e.g. drought, forest
fires, snow/ice melt exposing darker land surfaces) and
others negative (counterbalancing, e.g. increased
reflection of solar radiation from increased cloud cover).
It is the net effect of all positive and negative feedbacks
that leads to an overall increase or decrease in mean
global temperature. It is on this basis that the IPCC
concluded that current trends in CO
2
 emissions will
translate into mean global surface temperature increases
in coming decades.
One way to get a sense of the scale of change we may
be facing (especially for a scenario where we do not
cut back on CO
2
 emissions) is to look at future
projections for atmospheric CO
2
 concentrations on
the basis of current emission trends. Figure 3 shows
what current atmospheric CO
2
 concentrations look
like against the historical backdrop, and what is likely
for the next 100 years at two projection ranges (one
very conservative and therefore accompanied by a
high level of confidence, the other still within the
realms of possibility but accompanied by more
uncertainty).
As can be seen from this graph, current CO
2
concentrations are higher than they have been over the
last 420,000 years (Petit et al., 1999; IPCC, 2001a).
More recent research by the European Project for Ice
Coring in Antarctica pushes this date back to 650,000
years (Siegenthaler et al., 2005). According to this study,
current CO
2
 concentrations are 30% higher; CH
4
(methane – a much more potent greenhouse gas) is
130% higher; and the rate of CO
2
 increase is 200 times
faster than at any time in the last 650,000 years. The
IPCC also points out that current atmospheric CO
2
concentrations are quite possibly higher than at any time
in the last 20 million years (IPCC, 2001a).
At the current rate of increase there is a high probability
that atmospheric CO
2
 concentrations will rise to
double the pre-industrial level (from 280 ppm to 560
ppm) some time this century. The growing consensus
among climate scientists is that this would lead to a
mean warming of 30C (Kerr, 2004). Recall that 2.70C
is probably enough to melt the Greenland Ice Sheet
(other potential consequences are discussed below).
Another interesting finding from ice core climate
research relates to changes in climate variability (the
range of variation in the climate). During the last
several hundred thousand years the climate has been
characterised by huge and rapid shifts. Higher
resolution paleoclimate records (especially for the last
100,000 years) show that huge swings in the climate
have been the norm for this stage in the earth’s history,
and archaeological evidence suggests how very
challenging this was for early human societies trying
to cope with (and survive) the ice age. So, anyone who
says ‘climate change has happened throughout our
prehistory’ is right. If they also say ‘and therefore it is
not going to be a problem for contemporary society’,
they are way off the mark.
Climate variability
To understand why future climate change is so
threatening it is important to look more closely at the
last 10,000 years in relation to the very unstable period
that preceded it. The last 10,000 years is known as the
Holocene Epoch, which refers to the current, relatively
stable, warm period (interglacial) that we dwell in. Figure
4 shows a higher-resolution representation of past
climate using oxygen isotopes as a proxy for temperature
for the last 80,000 years.
This graph shows how the hugely variable climate that
has characterised the last half million years changed to
a very stable phase around 10,000 years ago. Agricultural
societies first developed at this time (i.e. 12,000–10,000
years ago). Prior to this stable period, climate variability
was much greater and would have posed a serious
problem for potential agriculturalists who, as intelligent
humans some 15,000 years ago (we have not evolved
much as a species since that time), had to stick to
nomadic hunting and gathering (see Burroughs, 2005).
One distinct possibility is that the agricultural revolution
happened at the same time that a change in the climate
allowed it to become possible.
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Another feature of past climate that this graph (and
many like it) reveals is the way that the climate has
changed very significantly and very abruptly in the past.
A good example is the sudden drop in temperature just
before the Holocene (below and slightly to the right of
the dotted line in Figure 4). This sudden cooling
happened 13,000 years ago as we were climbing out of
the last ice age, and is known to geographers and
geologists as the ‘Younger Dryas’. Temperatures abruptly
dropped to levels similar to the coldest part of the ice
age, stayed cold for 1,300 years, and then abruptly
warmed again (by 70C), in three steps each lasting five
years and spread over a 40–50-year period. This shows
that sudden temperature shifts of 1.40C–5.80C in mean
global temperature (i.e. the range predicted for this
century by the IPCC) are certainly possible.
Tipping point
One of the threats that accompanies contemporary
climate change is that global warming in the coming
decades could push our stable climate beyond a
critical tipping point, where it shifts into a different
system state. One possibility is a return to the colder
and highly variable climate that has been normal
for hundreds of thousands of years (e.g. the right-
hand side of Figure 4). But because current and
projected atmospheric CO
2
 concentrations are
already out of proportion to conditions that
prevailed for the last 650,000 years, there is a
possibility that a shift to a new system state will
take us into very uncharted territory, or at least into
conditions that have not been seen for many
millions of years (see Barrett in this volume).
There are a number of key components of the global
climate system that, if triggered, could lead to runaway
climate change, with potentially catastrophic
consequences. These include:
• Shutdown of the northern portion of the Gulf Stream,
leading to sudden regional cooling in western and
northern Europe. This can be caused by the dilution
Figure 4: Transition from the chaotic climate of the last ice age to the much more stable warm period of the
Holocene (10,000 ago – present). Past temperature is measured as concentrations of oxygen 18 isotopes from
the GISP2 ice core (o/oo) (Greenland). Oxygen 18 isotopes are displayed on the vertical (Y) axis, but the key
theme in this graph is the substantial difference in climate variability signalled prior to 10,000 years ago.
Source: data from Greenland Ice Sheet Project 2 (GISP2).
Figure 4. Transition from the last ice-age to the current stable warm period
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of North Atlantic surface waters as a consequence of
melting ice caps and sea ice (Clark et al., 2002).
• Sudden sea level rise: portions of large ice sheets
fragmenting and sliding into the sea, transferring
their volume to the oceans and raising sea levels
abruptly by tens of centimetres or a few metres;
• Tropical drought: a shift to a drier seasonal climate
in the Amazon Basin and South East Asia, leading
to the loss of their tropical rain forests and the release
of large volumes of CO
2
 from forest fires. Droughts
have been intensifying in South East Asia and
Amazonia in recent years and have been
accompanied by large-scale forest fires. If the dry
season in the Amazon Basin extends from four to
six months, there is an increased chance of losing
the rainforest (see Cox et al., 2004).
• Destabilisation of global methane reservoirs: release
of huge volumes of methane (more than 20 times
more potent than CO
2
 as a greenhouse gas) from the
sea bed and thawing permafrost. The record of
permafrost thaw in recent years is well established (see
NASA Earth Observatory website). The oceanic
methane reservoir (thousands of gigatons of carbon –
much bigger than the conventional fossil fuel reservoir)
exists as a form of ice in seabed sediments (below 500
metres depth in warmer regions and below 200 metres
in the Arctic), and remains stable under cold water
temperatures and/or high pressure (Kennett, 2002).
The releases of large volumes of methane from this
source have been associated with large submarine
‘landslides’ occurring in tropical waters during cold
periods and in polar waters during warm periods
(Maslin et al., 2004), possibly due to changes in ocean
currents at intermediate depths. If this methane were
released it would trigger further global warming.
Challenging civilisations
Clearly, human communities lived in many parts of the
world during the chaotic climate prior to the Holocene,
which suggests that we will survive if conditions return
to this situation. Surviving as a species and thriving as a
global civilisation are two different things. One key
difference between the ice age and now is that back then
our total population would have numbered in the
millions, whereas now we have 6.5 billion people to
support (rising by 90 million every year), and most of
us are reliant on a relatively stable climate for our food
supply and a relatively stable economic system to
distribute it (almost half of the human population now
live in cities).
It is also important to remember that civilisations
only became possible when agriculture enabled the
production of food surpluses, allowing a sedentary
existence in towns and cities, population increases, a
division of labour and the build-up of large armies.
Even though climate variability during the Holocene
has been relatively small (compared to the norm for
the last 400,000 years), these relatively small shifts
have been enough to collapse civilisations. For
example, around 5,000 years ago there was a relatively
minor climate shift that transformed the Sahara from
arable land to desert.
Historically, one of the biggest killers of human societies
is drought. Droughts lead to crop failures and food
shortages, which bring economic losses that can help
civilisations fail. The demise of the Akkadian civilisation
of Mesopotamia 4,200 years ago, the fragmentation of
Egyptian civilisation following the Seventh and Eight
Dynasties around the same time, the sudden decline of
the eastern Mediterranean economy around 3,000 years
ago and the fall of the Mayan civilisation in the ninth
century all coincided with shifts to a drier climate
(Burroughs, 2005). None of these shifts was
accompanied by the scale of atmospheric CO
2
concentrations we now face. Of course, we now have
more developed economies and technologies, but our
economies still rely heavily on natural resources that, in
turn, are reliant on a favourable climate.
Agriculture
Agriculture is based on the geographical intersection of
fertile soils with a favourable climate and water supply.
When the climate regime changes, this important
partnership is threatened. This theme did not escape
the Pentagon, which commissioned a report in 2003
on the threat of abrupt climate change in the 21st
century. It anticipates ‘harsher winter weather
conditions, sharply reduced soil moisture, and more
intense winds in certain regions that currently provide
a significant fraction of the world’s food production.
With inadequate preparation, the result could be a
significant drop in the human carrying capacity of the
Earth’s environment.’ It warns of food shortages due to
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decreases in net global agricultural production, decreased
availability of fresh water in key regions, and disrupted
access to energy supplies for the United States (Schwartz
and Randall, 2003).
Even in the absence of a change in the system state of
the global climate (e.g. shifting from a stable to a very
unstable condition), warming trends within the current
system state are likely to lead to shifts in the distribution
of precipitation, with droughts intensifying in some areas
and increased rainfall (and consequent flooding) in
others. Conservative estimates show that water
shortages are likely to affect agricultural productivity,
particularly in drier regions such as south western
and south eastern Australia, south western United
States, Mexico, much of northern Africa, parts of
northern China, parts of India, Central Asia, the
Middle East (IPCC, 2001b; Arnell, 2004) and eastern
New Zealand (IPCC, 2001b).
Storms
Increased sea surface temperatures lead to increased
evaporation, which puts more water vapour into the
atmosphere. This increases the amount of latent heat
in the weather system, which means there is more
energy for storms (i.e. they get more powerful).
Different studies published in the top scientific
journals (Science  and Nature) during 2005
independently reported an increase (globally) in the
frequency and/or severity of hurricanes. One study
using satellite data found that the number of category
4 and 5 storms doubled during the past 35 years in an
environment of increasing sea surface temperature.
They concluded that larger storms now occur 20-35%
more frequently than smaller storms (Webster et al.,
2005). Another study looked into storm intensity and
found that the power of storms had increased
significantly over the past 30 years in all the regions
studied, a result that is consistent with an increase in
sea surface temperature (Emanuel, 2005). Because no
storm comes with a bar code to identify whether it is a
consequence of climate change, we can never blame
climate change as the sole culprit for any single event.
What we can do is expect an increase in the frequency
of severe storms and the cost they impose on the
economy if the global climate continues to warm.
Storms over the ocean generate storm surges which
temporarily raise sea levels locally (as happened in New
Orleans in 2005). When combined with the global rise in
sea levels expected in the 21st century (20–80 cm), storm
surges from a larger number of more powerful storms pose
a significant threat of economic damage to low-lying regions
and countries, coastal property, infrastructures and coastal
cities. The cost of these kinds of events is not insignificant.
When insurance costs are combined with Federal outlays,
the total cost of Hurricane Katrina has been estimated at
US$200 billion (MSNBC, 2005).
Adaptation and mitigation
There is not room here to present the many other
impacts of climate change, in areas ranging from human
health to biodiversity, fisheries sustainability, coastal
erosion, financial systems, insurance, infrastructures and
migration, to name a few. Those inspired to have a closer
look can explore these themes by reading the ‘Summary
for Policy Makers’ for each of the three volumes of the
IPCC Third Assessment Report (available online at
http://www.ipcc.ch/).
Ultimately, climate change will be expensive, whether
from the direct impacts of a changing climate on our
economies, the cost of insurance, or from the
investments we will need to make in adaptation and
mitigation. Either way, it will continue to climb up the
policy agenda in coming years, as more and more people
realise the scale of the issues and the nature of the threats.
Two things remain clear:
1. Adaptation: we are committed to future climate
change irrespective of what we do regarding
emissions reductions, and as such we will need to
invest in adapting to this change.
2. Mitigation: if we want to be capable of adapting
successfully we will need to lower the scale of the
impacts that climate change promises to deliver.
Fortunately, we do have some degree of control over
this, and it relates primarily to the volume of
greenhouse gas emissions we choose to put into the
atmosphere annually. This is a global challenge and
the target is to stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations
to avoid dangerous anthropogenic interference with
the climate system (to use the language of Article 2
of the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change).
There is also insufficient room here to adequately explore
the themes of adaptation and mitigation, but a few
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things are worth mentioning. Because about 80% of
human-induced greenhouse gas emissions have arisen
from the burning of fossil fuels, any realistic approach
to mitigation will need to confront the global carbon-
based energy system and change it (sequester the carbon,
move to alternatives, dramatically increase energy
efficiency, and lower per capita demand). This will not
be easy, as currently 85% of global energy consumption
is based on fossil fuels, with 86% projected for 2025
(EIA, 2004). In the absence of any significant change
in energy systems, continued growth in world fossil fuel
use will increase global CO
2
 emissions by 1.9% per year
for the first quarter of the current century. This would
mean an increase from 23,899 million metric tons in
2001 to 37,124 million metric tons in 2025 (EIA,
2004). On this basis, by 2025 global CO
2
 emissions
will be 72% higher than 1990 levels. In the meantime,
the Kyoto Protocol is attempting to get countries to
stabilise emissions at 1990 levels.
No country can claim to be exempt from the impacts
of climate change or its causes in carbon-based energy
use and deforestation since the industrial revolution.
For this reason the response has to be a global
partnership, with each nation making a contribution
to the solution. This also means that domestic policy
and international negotiations need to be in sync. No
single country can solve this problem alone. If the
United States and the United Kingdom adhered to an
emissions target but China and India didn’t pursue one
we would still be no better off as a global community.
Even countries like Tuvalu and New Zealand that stand
to suffer the impacts but do not make a major
contribution to the global problem (because of low
population rather than low per capita emissions) will
need to participate in this solution partnership.
Domestic policy in such countries amounts to a
contribution in physical terms to the global emissions
reduction goal, but also enables those countries to
advocate strongly in the intergovernmental arena and
avoid the less convincing ‘do as I say, not as I do’
approach to international negotiations.
Conclusion
Climate change presents a significant challenge, but one
that we are definitely capable of meeting as a global
community. Understanding the nature of the risks
involved can help in priority setting for present and
future actions. Furthermore, the scale of the response
needs to be in proportion with these risks.
The solution path invites both change and continuity:
change in the way we fuel our economies and manage
our resources; continuity in the role of innovation and
ingenuity in the task of progress. We have an
abundance of intellectual resources for this task. All
that is needed are the policy and political resources to
make it happen. A significant barrier is the perceived
cost of choosing this path. Understanding the scientific
backdrop to climate change policy, however, can help
cultivate an appreciation that working to protect what
we have spent the last few centuries building is a very
worthy investment.
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